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A "TIME-SLICE" APPROACH TO TORT LAW'S
COMPONENT PARTS PROBLEM
Alani Golanski'
If you don't like my peaches, baby, why do you shake my tree?2
INTRODUCTION
Law, as it appears, usually does not need philosophy to solve its
problems. Lawyers articulate opposing interests, and the judge or ap-
pellate panel decides the particular controversy, aware that future le-
gal actors will draw general principles from the outcome. Legal
precedents and public policy will frame both the debate and the
decision.
At the same time, because judges are intellectually variegated be-
ings, other disciplines are always latent in legal decision-making.
Once in a while, the court will rely explicitly on a nonlegal discipline,
such as philosophy.3 This usually happens when the issue addressed is
one of first impression in the strong sense. Cases of strong first impres-
sion most likely surface when there has been a shift in the relevant
cultural or social landscape that has disoriented the court to some ex-
tent.4 A case of first impression arises in the weak sense however,
when no prior decision in the controlling jurisdiction is quite on point,
1. The author is an appellate lawyer, and a doctoral student in philosophy at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York. He thanks Stephen Grover for his patient instruc-
tion and invaluable comments on the manuscript, Jaegwon Kim, Michael Levin and Arnulf
Zweig for their kind teaching in areas relevant to this paper, Catherine A. Roberts for sharing
analogies in applied mathematics, and Gina Gabriella Schmeling.
2. Blossom Dearie, Dearie's Blues, on BLOSSOM DEARIE, 51 VERVE JAZZ MASTERS (Uni/
Verve 1996) (1959).
3. See e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (relying
on Karl Popper and other philosophers to define a standard for judicial scrutiny of proffered
scientific testimony); Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923-24 (1887) (using Aristotelian lan-
guage to decide the mutual mistake issue in a contract case).
4. See e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (using nonlegal authorities in
rejecting the prior doctrine that separate but equal educational facilities affords equal and suffi-
cient treatment to different racial groups); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (noting, inter alia,
Plato's, Aristotle's, St. Augustine's and Bracton's views on abortion in fashioning a novel consti-
tutional doctrine).
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but "persuasive analogies and principles applied in cases not readily
distinguishable from this are to be considered."'5
The component parts issue in tort law is only one of first impression
in the weak sense, but it still will be an issue of first impression in most
states. Because the courts can and will eventually address the prob-
lem in the usual way, inferring from precedents and policy concerns,
they will not explicitly incorporate any philosophy. To the extent that
there is a closely analogous issue in philosophy, elegant approaches in
that discipline will give an extralegal basis for evaluating the law's res-
olution in hindsight. Conversely, law's resolution should inform the
"common sense" and "pragmatic" impulses that often motivate phi-
losophy.6 If solutions in the respective disciplines diverge, there will
be latent and destabilizing tensions in each; however, if the good solu-
tions are in accord, one discipline will tend to stabilize the other.
So, what is the component parts problem in tort law? In one scena-
rio, company D sells its product, which contains "unreasonably dan-
gerous" and hence, some "defective" component parts.7 The product
is an injector or oil lubricator pump designed for battleships, and the
dangerous parts are its asbestos-containing gaskets. After some time,
the gaskets wear out and the buyer, the Navy, installs replacement
gaskets manufactured and supplied by an otherwise unknown com-
pany, called not-D. The replacement gaskets also contain asbestos
and are not observably different from the original parts. Some time
later, worker A, who is repairing battleships, is exposed to asbestos
fibers released from the replacement gaskets, and this causes his lung
cancer and eventual death. When A's estate sues, D's defense is that
the injurious product is not the same product that D sold.8
A metaphysical question is whether the pump that harmed A is the
same pump that D sold to the Navy. If the pump is a persisting thing,
then what does its persistence consist in? Is the pump at the time of
5. United States v. Glidden, Co., 78 F.2d 639, 641 (6th Cir. 1935).
6. See e.g., PAUL GRICE, POSTWAR OXFORD PHILOSOPHY IN STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS
172 (1989); HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION Xi (1995).
7. Traditionally, a "defective" product is one that, when it the leaves the seller's hands, is
capable of harming an ordinary user in a way he would not reasonably foresee. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. 1 (1965).
8. For background doctrinal reading on tort law's component parts issue, see generally Rich-
ard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of In-
termediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185 (1996); Michael
B. Gallub, Limiting the Manufacturer's Duty for Subsequent Product Alteration:
Three Steps to a Rational Approach, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 361 (1988); M. Stuart Madden, Com-
ponent Parts and Raw Materials Sellers: from the Titanic to the New Restatement, 26 N. Ky. L.
REV. 535 (1999); Edward M. Mansfield, Reflections on Current Limits on Component and Raw
Material Supplier Liability and the Proposed Third Restatement, 84 Ky. L.J. 221 (1996).
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sale and at the time of A's exposure parts of a unified whole? Is there
something that the pump is that does not change through time? Is
there some sort of substratum that allows the pump to retain its iden-
tity even though its parts, and sometimes its properties, are changed
or replaced? Is this essentially a question of being able to point to the
pump at the time of sale and at the time of exposure to affirm its
identity, or perhaps at least the historical unity of the identified
objects?
Rhetorically speaking, A's estate advances if it can convince the
court that the thing D sold and the thing that harmed A are "the
same," even if they are not strictly identical. But A's estate does not
necessarily win on that ground. The plaintiff still must show that the
product D sold was defective, and that this defect was a substantial
contributing factor in causing A's injury.9 Even if the pump's persis-
tence through time evidences a causal nexus, this nexus might not be
strong enough to prove that D's misconduct was a substantial contrib-
uting factor. Maybe the pump persists in "fusion" with the replace-
ment gaskets, but the replacement has intervened to deprive D's
actions of substantial causal effect.
On the other hand, it is possible that the defect at the time of sale
could be causally linked to the injurious exposure even if the pump at
both times is deemed to be two different, non-identical, and non-per-
sisting things. This sort of causal connection would likely be consid-
ered too weak or remote to be proximate and A's estate would
probably lose under that scenario. 10 For example, consider the mar-
keting of a generic, albeit dangerous, drug patterned after Manufac-
turer X's design. X's behavior would supply a link in the but for chain
of causation, but it would be too remote to engender liability for harm
resulting from a plaintiff's ingestion of the generic product.
9. Caruolo v. John Crane, Inc., 226 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2000); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. at Maryland, 205 F.3d 615, 656 (3d Cir. 2000).
10. See generally Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1 (1909) (saying
"[t]he law, in its practical administration, . . . regards only proximate or immediate and
not remote causes, and in ascertaining which is proximate and which remote refuses to
indulge in metaphysical niceties. Where, in the sequence of events between the original
default and the final mischief an entirely independent and unrelated cause intervenes,
and is of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the mischief, the second cause is ordi-
narily regarded as the proximate cause and the other as the remote cause");
Peters v. The Warren Ins. Co., 39 U.S. 99 (1840) (similarly noting that "[i]f these questions are to
be settled rather by the common sense than by the metaphysics of the law, then it would seem to
be clear, that the collision here is ... not the proximate cause, for that is proximate which lies
nearest; and here another cause is interposed, and thus lies nearer"); Barati v. Aero Indus., Inc.,
579 So.2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1991) (saying there is no proximate cause if the range of danger
is too remote to be reasonably foreseeable, or there is an independent cause that breaks the
chain of causation).
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These legal and philosophical issues interweave with considerations
of relevance as the main interdisciplinary constraint. On the other
hand, influential legal thinkers claim that law and philosophy speak
such different languages that juxtaposing the disciplines is ill-advised,
either because "the natural affinity of law is... not with the abstract,
conceptual, and theoretical""I or because the theoretical is irrelevant
to law's practical concerns. 12 It is true that law's concerns, in immedi-
ately solving practical controversies and setting good policy, are not
usually philosophy's concerns. But legal doctrines developed in meta-
physics' penumbra carry more currency and bring reason to law, if the
metaphysics they imply is sound.
This essay bypasses the familiar strictures against any claim that
what is legal is philosophical. Part II refers to a small group of inter-
esting legal decisions addressing aspects of the component parts prob-
lem. Part III favors the "time-slice" or "four-dimensionalist"
approach initiated by Willard Van Orman Quine. The general claim is
that the injector pump that D sold in the previous example persisted
through the time of A's harmful exposure. If that is true, philosophy
may neatly support, and possibly clarify, legal policy. Part IV further
supports this claim by arguing that any artifact's persistence consists
of the causal bond between its temporal phases. It is here where law
may contribute reciprocally to philosophy, and this section critiques
Wesley Salmon's promising propagation theory of causation.1 3
II. LEGAL CASES INVOLVING THE COMPONENT PARTS PROBLEM
D says that even if it did something wrong, its misconduct could not
have caused A's injury. The asbestos gaskets to which A was exposed
were replacement parts made and sold by not-D. Regardless of
whether the Navy replaced the gaskets two years or even two days
after purchase, D may escape liability for all post-replacement
exposure. 14
11. JAMES BOYD WHIE, FROM EXIPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL
EDUCATION 58 (1999).
12. See e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992).
13. Wesley C. Salmon, Causality: Production and Propagation, 2 PHIL. SCIENCE ASSN. 49 (Pe-
ter D. Asquith & Ronald N. Giere eds. 1980), reprinted in WESLEY C. SALMON, CAUSALITY AND
ExPLANATION 285, 286 (1998).
14. Asbestos is a white or light gray natural mineral, obtained by mining actinolite and amphi-
bole, and occurring in long slender needles or fibrous masses that historically has been woven
into acid-resisting, nonconducting, and fireproof products. As early as 1935, asbestos was widely
recognized as a mortal threat affecting a large proportion of those workers who had regularly
come in contact with the material. Because most asbestos materials are highly friable (readily
crumbled), the fibers are easily airborne and consequently may be inhaled, often resulting in
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In most courts, D will not win. In one significant case, Welch v.
Dura-Wound, Inc., 15 Dura-Wound manufactured a machine for mold-
ing fiberglass pipes. It sold the machine to an intermediary that
"made no modifications," but added some component parts for which
the machine was designed. 16 The issue was whether Dura-Wound was
liable for defects in those parts. The court held that a company is
responsible for harm caused by replacement or accessory parts if the
product was "purposefully designed" to accept those parts, unless the
additional parts substantially modify the product.
17
This, of course, does not mean that the intermediary and the manu-
facturer of the added parts are not responsible; liability is jointly im-
posed. The important point is that Dura-Wound's liability must be
predicated on a causal connection. The idea of "purposeful design"
carries causal power sufficient to be a proximate cause. If there is a
hidden metaphysical premise in Welch, it might be that Dura-Wound's
machine persisted through its combination or "fusion" with additional
component parts. What bonded this persisting thing through its tem-
poral phases was the causal power inherent in the purposeful product
design. This article contends that this purposefulness, which shaped
the product during its earliest phase, was somehow projected onto the
product in its later phases.
Alternatively, one could contend that a philosophical notion of tem-
poral persistence is gratuitous in the context of legal thinking, due to
the multiplying of entities beyond necessity.' 8 The law's plainspoken
lung scarring and disease. See generally BARRY 1. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LE-
GAL ASPEcrs 16-32 (2d ed. 1986); IRVING SELIKOFF & DAVID LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 23
(1978).
15. 894 F. Supp. 76 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
16. id. at 77.
17. Id. at 78; see also Hart v. Hytrol Conveyor Co. Inc., 823 F. Supp. 87, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(saying unless "replacement lagging modified the design" of the product, the harm caused by
that replacement part is defendant's responsibility); Feuerverger v. Hobart Corp., 738 F. Supp.
76, 77-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the defendant was liable for injury caused by its com-
mercial food mixer, although it didn't make or sell the defective part, because it "purposefully
designed the Mixer to accept various accessories, including the Attachment"); Denny v. Ford
Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 n.3 (1995) (ruling that liability "arises from an intentional deci-
sion by the manufacturer to configure the product in a particular way"); Kimble v. East Chicago
Tool Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3659, at *11 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 1995) (manufacturer will be
deemed liable "where the necessity of the replacement parts ... was foreseeable [unless] the
replacement part was so different from the original as to substantially increase the risk of injury
to persons operating such machine"); Matera v. Catanzano, 161 A.D.2d 687 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(saying manufacturer would be liable if product "was purposefully manufactured in order to
facilitate the making of the alteration," unless defendant proves that harm "would not have
happened had this alteration not been made").
18. See Ernest Moody, William of Ockham, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 306, 307
(Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
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policy preferences may be sufficiently explanatory. Perhaps, as Im-
manuel Kant objected to eighteenth century rationalist doctrines of
the substantiality and persistence of the soul, one should realize that
talk of things in similar terms says more than one has an epistemic
right to say. 19 The problem, however, is that if a product is a different
thing after some alteration or addition, what is the causal vehicle link-
ing the defendant's original misconduct to the plaintiff's injuries? In
law, "[p]roof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do."' 20
Therefore, the idea of the hidden premise, that Dura-Wound's ma-
chine persisted, seems sustainable.
In another interesting decision, Morris v. American Motors Corp.,21
the court ruled that an original manufacturer is liable for any defective
replacement component part that "was an integral part" of the prod-
uct, and opined that the buyer "purchases a package that includes far
more than the item delivered itself. ' 22 This language is metaphysi-
cally vague because it supports contrasting, though not necessarily
conflicting, views: that the item sold persisted and that some larger
package also persisted. In other words, the replaced piece may be an
integral part of the product purchased, in which case, the two have
fused and the original item continues. Alternatively, the product plus
replacement may amount to some bigger package that was originally
purchased, and that package also continues. Either way, the court's
view was that the original manufacturer's act before the sale can be
proximately linked to the harm caused by the persisting thing. Thus,
there is some sort of projection of the defendant's intent, or pur-
poseful design, onto the later phase of the item or package.
A's estate would be pleased with the cases mentioned so far. D will
be able to rely upon the sort of case that holds a manufacturer liable
for another entity's component parts only when it personally installed
them into its finished product. In one such case, Ford Motor Co. v.
19. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 411-58 (A 341/B 399) (Paul Guyer & Allen
W. Wood trans., eds., 1997) (1781/1787). Kant says, inter alia, that "substance itself never can be
thought by our understanding, however deep we may penetrate." IMMANUEL KANT,
PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS THAT CAN QUALIFY AS A SCIENCE 99 (Paul
Carus trans., 1902) (1783). The qualification "by our understanding" is important, because else-
where Kant explains that we can "think" of objects as things in themselves, but that's all we can
do in regard to the noumenal world. Kant's distinction is between thinking, which can be of
"whatever I like," and knowing and cognizing, which must be limited by the conditions of our
"sensible intuition," KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra, at 115 (B xxvi) which thus must
be it is within the "bounds of experience." Id. at 148 (B 23).
20. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 62 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting FREDERICK POLLACK,
THE LAW OF ToRTS 455 (11th ed. 1920)).
21. 459 A.2d 968 (1982).
22. Id. at 574-75.
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Wood,23 the court's less interesting point was policy based. It found
that when a manufacturer "assembles" a product, it benefits economi-
cally from the sale of the incorporated components and implicitly rep-
resents to the buyer and ultimate user that the product, including the
components, is safe.24
A more interesting rationale, taken from an earlier federal ruling, is
worth quoting in relevant part:
"[I]f an assembler were strictly liable for an 'identical' replacement
part purchased from a third party, the court would be forced to con-
duct an inquiry into whether the original and the replacement parts
were manufactured by the same company .... If so, whether the
original and replacement parts were sufficiently similar? ... If so,
whether the original and replacement parts were manufactured
utilizing a similar process and similar materials? If so, at what point
in time did endorsement by the assembler of the component manu-
facturer come to an end, if ever?" 25
If the Wood and Exxon language is interpreted philosophically, one
might be warranted in saying that the harmful product was the same
as the original product, but only if the new part was "identical" to the
original. But as a practical matter, it simply would be too complex to
establish that two different things, such as the original component and
its replacement, were "identical." Of course, the court is speaking
pragmatically, using the locution "a is identical with [Y" in a loose
sense, which is consistent with saying "Some things are true of a that
are [not] true of 3."26 Nor has the court's language anything to do
with the Leibnizian doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles.
27
23. 703 A.2d 1315, 1331 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
24. Id. at 34.
25. Id. at 1331(quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1521, 1527-
28 (D. Hawaii 1991)); see also Baughman v. General Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1132-33 (4th
Cir. 1986) (refusing to hold truck manufacturer liable for defective wheel rim it had not supplied
or installed); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959); Walton v. Harnischfe-
ger, 796 S.W.2d 225, 227-28 (Tex. App. 1990) (saying crane manufacturer had no duty to warn
about rigging it had not made or incorporated into its crane); Newman v. General Motors Corp.,
524 So.2d 207, 209 (La. App. 1988) (holding truck manufacturer was not liable for defective
ratchet assembly it had not incorporated into its product); Spencer v. Ford Motor Co., 367
N.W.2d 393, 396 (Mich.App. 1985) (ruling vehicle manufacturer was not liable for defective
wheel rim component added after sale).
26. See RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, Identity Through Time, in PERSON AND OBJEcr: A META-
PHYSICAL STUDY (1976), reprinted in METAPHYSICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 273, 275 (Jaegwon Kim &
Ernest Sosa eds., 1999).
27. GOTTIFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, 4 DIE PHILOSOPHISCHEN SCHRIFTEN 433 (L 308) (C. I.
Gerhardt ed., 1965) (1857-90) (saying "[i]t is not true that two substances may be exactly alike
and differ only numerically, solo numero"); GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, 7 DIE PHILOSOPHIS-
CHEN SCHRIFTEN 393 (L 700) (C. I. Gerhardt ed., 1965) (1857-90) (inferring from the principle of
sufficient reason "that there are not in nature two real, absolute beings, indiscernible from each
other").
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In any event, the court's discussion of the "identity," however loose
the sense of the term, of the replacement parts begs the question of
whether the product is the same as the product prior to the replace-
ment of parts. For example, the water in the East River beneath the
Brooklyn Bridge at t, will not be the same water that is under it at t2;
the question is really whether the river is the same.
In Wood, the plaintiff worked at a garage that fixed Ford vehicles.
Ford's brake and clutch linings contained up to sixty percent chryso-
tile asbestos by weight, but the brake and clutch parts at the garage
were not the original parts and no witness in the case knew the manu-
facturer.28 Perhaps each Ford vehicle was a "'being by aggregation"'
or an "assemblage" of "material objects and not properly speaking a
single material object in its own right. ' 29 Alternatively, each vehicle is
most elegantly seen as a four-dimensional object, with any alteration
in spatial parts being one signifier of a separate temporal phase.
These sorts of questions are at issue, as well as such metaquestions as
whether we are really dealing with ontological status, or rather with
our special human interests in conceptualizing entities in certain ways.
No one, however, would deny that things discernibly different are not
identical.30
Justice Benjamin Cardozo was correct about the notion of causality
during the time Bertrand Russell was denouncing the notion as "a
relic of a bygone age. '31 In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,32
Cardozo first noted that the defective component part, a wheel, was
not made by the defendant, but was bought from another manufac-
turer. 33 He said: (1) "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasona-
bly certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is
then ['persists as'] a thing of danger; '34 and (2) the manufacturer of
28. Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 703 A.2d 1315, 1319 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
29. Richard Cartwright, Scattered Objects, in ANALYSIS AND METAPHYSICS 153-71 (Keith
Lehrer ed., 1975), reprinted in METAPHYSICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 291, 294 (Jaegwon Kim & Ernest
Sosa eds., 1999) (quoting Letter of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to Antoine Arnauld, dated Apr.
30, 1687, reprinted in GOrrFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ: DISCOURSE ON METAPHYSICS, CORRE-
SPONDENCE WITH ARNAULD, MONADOLOGY 189-91 (George R. Montgomery trans., 1945).
30. One factor skewing the purity of the analysis with respect to Wood is that, in that case, the
verdict sheet asked the jury whether Wood was exposed to Ford's asbestos-containing products,
identified during trial as brake and clutch linings. Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 703 A.2d 1315, 1330
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). Also, '[i]t was not until after the close of all the evidence, during a
discussion of the jury verdict form, that Mrs. Wood articulated for the first time her theory that
Ford's duty to warn stemmed from its sale of the vehicles rather than its sale of brakes." Id.
31. BERTRAND RUSSELL, On The Notion of Cause, in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC AND OTHER
ESSAYS 180 (1929) (1913).
32. I1 N.E. 1050, 1051-52 (1916).
33. Id. at 1051-52.
34. Id. at 1053.
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the finished product cannot be relieved from liability unless the com-
ponent part manufacturer's conduct is deemed to be "an independent
cause [which] intervene[s] ' 35 to render defendant's conduct "too re-
mote to constitute, as to the ultimate user, an actionable wrong. '36
The following section offers a time-slice explanation of (1), and Part
IV shows why (2)'s causal language makes sense in a way Cardozo
would not have contemplated.
III. THE TIME-SLICE IDEA
Contractors built the Empire State Building from 1930 until 1931.
Assume that workers fastened the final bolt on April 1, 1931, at to,37
and that in 1945, at time t1 , a B-25 bomber crashed into the 79th floor
of the building. At t2, workers completed repairs and replaced steel
beams, concrete walls, and various other building parts. At t 3 , in 1951,
a television mast was placed on top of the building, increasing its
height from 1,250 feet to 1,472 feet. 38
The Empire State Building has a certain three-dimensional profile
at any particular time, so it has a certain historical profile along its
fourth-dimensional temporal axis. As a thing in space, the building is
different at different points, such as large at the base, narrow and
pointy at the top, and so forth. And as a thing in time, it can be analo-
gously varied, as previously shown, from one temporal phase to the
next. In a space-time diagram, the building as a three-dimensional
object would be an event represented by a point, but four-dimension-
ally, it would be a process represented by a line.39
The idea of four-dimensionality is not traditional. While accepting
that things may "endure" by being wholly present at more than one
time,40 the familiar three-dimensional perspective has seemed to phi-
losophers inconsistent with the view that things changing in time per-
sist. Three dimensionalists tend to conclude that things do not survive
a change of parts. Thomas Reid wrote:
35. Id. 1054.
36. The case has been most often cited for its rejection of Buick's privity claim that tort liabil-
ity "grows out of contract and nothing else," and that the purchaser car dealer "was the one
person whom it was under a legal duty to protect." Id.
37. 1 choose to say the Empire State Building was completed then, rather than on May 1,
1931, when President Hoover pressed a button in Washington, D.C., officially opening the build-
ing and turning on its lights.
38. Empire State Building, at http://www.esbnyc.com/html/history/html (visited on Nov. 16,
2000).
39. See Salmon, supra note 13.
40. DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS 202-03 (1986).
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All bodies, as they consist of innumerable parts that may be dis-
joined from them by a great variety of causes, are subject to contin-
ual changes of their substance, increasing, diminishing, changing
insensibly. When such alterations are gradual, because language
could not afford a different name for every different state of such a
changeable being, it retains the same name, and is considered as the
same thing. Thus we say of an old regiment that it did such a thing a
century ago, though there now is not a man alive who then belonged
to it. We say a tree is the same in the seed-bed and in the forest. A
ship of war, which has successively changed her anchors, her tackle,
her sails, her masts, her planks, and her timbers, while she keeps the
same name is the same.4'
Reid's reference to "[a] ship of war" recalls the problem of the Ship
of Theseus. 42 For the purpose of this article, the story may be told this
way: As an important artifact in their mythology, Athenians pre-
served Theseus's ship along the Aegean. After a while, they replaced
a plank. Over time, every plank and each anchor . . . was replaced.
Meanwhile, a Cretan shipbuilder found and gathered the discarded
parts and transported them to Iriklion. Although, he assembled (or
reassembled) the entire ship, both the Cretans and the Athenians
claimed to possess the Ship of Theseus.
It is not clear which way Reid decides the case. Philosophically, he
leans toward the Cretans, but legally, he realizes that what the Atheni-
ans have "is considered as the same thing" through its gradual
changes.4 3 That the Ship of Theseus "retains the same name" while in
the Athenian's continued possession seems a significant legal fact.44
In short, Reid is conflicted, and conflicts between philosophical think-
ing and legal decision-making destabilize.
Important thinkers in Reid's camp include Joseph Butler and his
champion in this area, Roderick Chisholm. Chisholm's two theses,
adopted from Butler, are: (1) that artifacts and physical things, such
as trees, ships, bodies and houses, being entia per alio, generally per-
sist "only in a loose and popular sense," and (2) that persons, as entia
per se, persist "in a strict and philosophical sense. ' 45 This article re-
fers to theorists such as Chisholm and Butler as dichotomists and their
theory as the dichotomy view.
41. THOMAS REID, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in THE WORKS OF THOMAS
REI, 346 (Sir William Hamilton ed., 1854).
42. Plato, Phaedo 58', in COMPLETE WORKS 49, 50 (John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson,
eds. G.M.A. Grube trans., 1997).
43. REID, supra note 41, at 346.
44. Id.
45. CHISHOLM, supra note 26, at 277.
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It is evident that for the dichotomy view to be valid, there must be
criteria that establishes persistence in a strict, philosophical sense in
the case of persons, which is absent in the non-person cases. Put dif-
ferently, if the criterion that applies in the case of a strict continuant
also applies in loose continuant cases, the supposed dichotomy fails.
So, what is it that holds people together as the same persons
through time? The literature tends to divide according to whether
bodily or psychological factors are emphasized, but sometimes they
are combined.46 John Locke believed that people's memories provide
them a special epistemic access to their pasts and allow each "intelli-
gent Being [to] consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing, in
different times and places. ' 47 Joseph Butler, who thought kindly of
souls, said Locke's view was fallacious because "consciousness of per-
sonal identity presupposes, and therefore, cannot constitute, personal
identity, any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute
truth, which it presupposes. '48
But it seems reasonable to say that self-consciousness is a fairly
good candidate to define what it means to persist as a person. Self-
consciousness, or perhaps the soul, is something that is "ultimate,
[and] unanalysable in terms of such observable and experienceable
phenomena as bodily continuity and continuity of memory." 49 A the-
ory of souls upholds the dichotomy view; however, it is doubtful
whether one is qualified to posit an opinion on souls. The Kantian
argument is that people are not entitled to infer from the mind's func-
tions, or its cognitive tasks and abstract subtasks, a constituent sub-
stance.50 For example, learning a software program does not confer
an understanding of the hardware. 51
On the other hand, the run-of-the-mill psychological criteria do not
fare so well. Even apart from Butler's analytic point, empirically,
memories go daft. For example, I remember picking up a jacket on
the steps to the United Nations building during a fourth grade field
trip. In my mind, it is equiprobable that the jacket was mine and I had
dropped it, of which I have an image; or that the jacket was a class-
46. See CHISHOLM, supra note 26, at 104-114.
47. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 335 (Peter H. Nidditch
ed., 1975); see also Sydney Shoemaker, Persons and Their Pasts, 7 AM. PHIL. Q. 269, 269 (1970).
48. Joseph Butler, Of Personal Identity, First Dissertation to the Analogy of Religion, re-
printed in PERSONAL IDENTITY (John Perry ed., 1975); see also Shoemaker, supra note 43, at 347-
48 (quoting Joseph Butler).
49. Richard Swinburne, Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory, in METAPHYSICS: AN AN-
THOLOGY 377, 387 (Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa eds., 1999).
50. KANT, supra note 19, at 445 (B 407).
51. PATRICIA KITCHER, KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 191 (1990).
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mate's and I handed it to him. Consciousness is interrupted when we
sleep, suffer amnesia, go insane, or are anaesthetized. In another ex-
ample, given the unfortunate news that I will be tortured tomorrow, I
would not be comforted by the additional information that, tonight,
machine x will drain me of all current memories, while machine y in-
stalls into my brain someone else's past impressions.52
Perhaps these examples show why "[t]he most natural theory of
personal identity which readily occurs to people, is that personal iden-
tity is constituted by bodily identity. ' 53 The problem is that a bodily
identity theory immediately defeats dichotomism. Our bodies dissi-
pate and replenish each day, and we have transplants and all sorts of
-ectomies.
It seems that in the end, the dichotomist is left with a psychological
basis for personal persistence. This essay does not quarrel with the
view that conscious beings may persist by virtue of their conscious-
ness. But neither does it accept that it is consciousness qua conscious-
ness that does the trick. Otherwise, the amnesiac does not persist, nor
does the anaesthetized patient or the sleeper. However, people want
to say that they do persist. Moreover, it is useful to keep in mind the
growing view that in the final analysis, psychological properties may
be reducible, to some great extent, to physical ones. 54
The above analysis suggests that the dichotomy view may collapse
by reductio ad absurdum. We are loathe to give up the view that per-
sons persist, but at the same time our efforts at distinguishing persons
from non-persons vis-A-vis persistence are not satisfactory. Chisholm
is fairly confident and well rooted in persuasive authorities in believ-
ing that physical things do not persist, but he is unclear when it comes
to persons. He concedes, "There may be no sufficient reason at all for
deciding that you are or that you are not one or the other of the two
different persons," but reminds readers that the truth-conditions of a
proposition that persons are continuants and the evidence we can
have for assessing that proposition's truth value are two different
things.55
This article's goal is not to firm up the reductio, but merely to show
that it is reasonable to suspect that it fatally infects dichotomism. One
52. See Bernard Williams, The Self and the Future, 79 PHIL. REV. 161, 167-68 (1970).
53. Swinburne, supra note 49, at 377.
54. See generally JAEGWON KIM, MIND IN A PHYSICAL WORLD: AN ESSAY ON THE MIND-
BODY PROBLEM AND MENTAL CAUSATION 94-103 (1998); Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences, or
The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis, 28 SYNTHESE 77 (1974); Hilary Putnam, On
Properties, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL G. HEMPEL (N. Rescher ed., 1969), reprinted in META-
PHYSICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 243, 247-49 (Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa eds., 1999).
55. CHISHOLM, supra note 26, at 335.
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can speculate from his writings that were Chisholm to be convinced by
reasoning along these lines, he would resolve to delete persistence on
the persons side of the divide because, after all, the evidence is just not
there. However, this resolution seems to conflict with our best in-
stincts. More likely than not, the author of Of Human Bondage was
the author of Cakes and Ale.56
This article begins with the presumption, which Chisholm rightly in-
dicates has not been rebutted, that persons do persist. But, as we have
seen, the feature underlying this continuance may not be unique to
persons; and as noted earlier, if the persistence criterion that applies
in the case of persons as continuants also holds in other cases, the
dichotomy view fails.
Therefore, the focus shifts from analyzing whether persons persist
or by which criterion they persist, to asking in which way non-person
objects may also persist. If there is an acceptable answer for physical
objects that also applies to persons, dichotomism is defeated and per-
sons and non-persons alike may be deemed continuants, either in a
philosophically satisfying, hence strict sense, or in a loose sense.
It is arguable that the time-slice view can generate an acceptable
answer. If there are no reservations about stating that the Empire
State Building is what it is at its base or at its mast and it is a spatially
continuous entity, then it should not be too difficult to accept that the
Empire State Building persists along a temporal axis from to -> t •...
tn. In time-slice thinking, each t-value becomes a temporal part or
phase, conceptually analogous in many respects to the spatial parti-
tioning that people endorse.
The spatial-temporal analogy is not pristine. We can come fairly
close to an identity between temporal parts, but can not at all come
close to an identity between non-overlapping spatial parts. For exam-
ple, it is possible, logically and perhaps empirically, that the Empire
State Building may endure unchanged between t1 7 and t18, but it is
certainly not possible that its Fifth Avenue entrance is identical to the
one on Thirty-Fourth Street. What exactly fills one region of space at
a given time cannot be what exactly fills some other spatial region at
the same time, but "the corresponding spacetime principle is
wrong. '' 57 It seems that this point is not defeated by saying, as Arm-
strong does, that separate temporal phases "may be different from
56. W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, OF HUMAN BONDAGE (1992); W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM,
CAKES AND ALE (1930).
57. Peter van Inwagen, Four-Dimensional Objects. 24 NoOs 245, 248 (1990).
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(and even incompatible with) each other. '58 The premise shows that
the disanalogy is that they may not be.
Nevertheless, identity is a stronger claim than persistence. There-
fore, the idea that a thing's distinct temporal phases, but not spatial
parts, may be identical does not cut against a time-slice view of
persistence.
The time-slice approach would be challenged if persistence meant
identity, but it does not. Persistence is a matter of unity, not identity.
As Perry says, "It is extremely important not to confuse the unity rela-
tion for an object with the relation of identity. ' 59 A relational view, as
opposed to an identity view, provides the concept that warrants the
persistence claim. For example, as the relation between one of the
injector pump's gaskets and the rest of the pump unifies the two par-
ticulars, the relation between the pump at t, and at ty is similarly one
of unity.60
Willard Van Orman Quine provides the groundbreaking thesis, and
Mark Heller provides the most compelling argument for a time-slice
approach. In the very first lines of his classic essay,61 Quine commits
to "[t]he most natural theory. '62 In other words, he asks how persons
can be continuants given that our material substance is completely re-
placed every few years. 63 Talk of immortal souls would be "agreea-
ble," but would not solve Heracleitus's parallel problem, such as how
we can say that we have bathed in the same river twice. 64
The truth for Quine is that "you can bathe in the same river twice,
but not in the same river-stages .... A river is a process through time,
and the river-stages are its momentary parts. '65 Two river-stages at
the same spatial coordinates are not identical, but merely "river-kin-
dred"; likewise, a multiplicity of water molecules upstream on one day
are water-kindred with the same molecular multiplicity downstream,
58. David M. Armstrong, Identity Through Time, in TIME AND CAUSE: ESSAYS PRESENTED
To RICHARD TAYLOR 67, 68 (Peter van Inwagen ed., 1980) (emphasis added).
59. John Perry, Can the Self Divide?, 69 J. PHIL. 463, 468 (1972). Perry explains:
Of course the two are connected in an important way. If a and b are (temporal or
spatial) parts of an object of certain kind K, and RK is the (temporal or spatial) unity
relation for Ks, then, if the K of which a is a part is identical with the K of which b is a
part, a must have RK to b. But, nevertheless, RK is not the relation of identity, and must
not be confused with it.
Id. Armstrong, on the other hand, "believe[s] that identity is not a genuine relation." Arm-
strong, supra note 58, at 67.
60. Id. at 68.
61. Willard Van Orman Quine, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, 47 J. PHIL. 621 (1950).
62. Swinburne, supra note 49, at 377; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
63. Quine, supra note 61, at 621.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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and maybe part of a different river on the next day. 66 But if we were
to point to river-stage a and later to river-stage b, each time saying,
"This is the Cayster," we would be inductively affirming the "identity"
of the objects pointed to.67 In sum, imputing identity fixes the refer-
ence of the ostension.
Quine's 'identity' is not strict. Heracleitus summoned the river be-
cause it is always paradigmatically changing. Gottlob Frege, however,
said a term's reference to "a single object" is the standard by which we
may call the term "a proper name."' 68 As Quine restates Frege to de-
cide whether a term is being used to name something, one may ask
whether it is viewed as subject in any given context to "the algorithm
of identity: the law of putting equals for equals.
69
Sensitivity to contexts is a pragmatic feature. Under Quine's prag-
matism, it is spurious to ask how much of science depends on lan-
guage, and how much genuinely reflects reality; answering these
questions requires a discussion about the world, and a presupposition
of a "conceptual scheme peculiar to our own special language.
'
"70
Nonetheless, calling the Cayster at a identical to the Cayster at b
may invite the charge of an illicit slide from the momentary manifesta-
tion of a thing, called R, to the manifestation of a momentary thing,
say R-stage. 71 One may be able to avoid the charge this way: (1) use
'identity' strictly; and (2) distinguish, as this essay has done, but
Chisholm has not,72 between identity and persistence or continuance.
Given (1) and (2), a thing's continuance from t, to ty, in a strict and
philosophical sense is not necessarily its strict identity at t, and ty; nor
does an admission of the lack of its strict identity at t, and ty contradict
the claim of its strict continuance. 73 Under these conditions, one can
begin with the momentary manifestation of a momentary, albeit per-
sisting, unified thing. Then, ending with the manifestation of a mo-
66. Id. at 622.
67. Id.
68. GOTTLOB FREGE, On Sinn and Bedeutung, in THE FREGE READER 151, 152-53 (Michael
Beaney ed., Max Black trans., 1997) (1892).
69. Quine, supra note 61, at 630.
70. Id. at 632.
71. See Mark Johnston, Is There a Problem About Persistence?-Part 1, 61 PROC. ARISTOTE-
LIAN SOC'Y 107, 108-09 (1987).
72. For Chisholm, "playing loose with the 'is' of identity" is tantamount to the "kind of loose-
ness involved when we say that such things as the Ship of Theseus persist through time."
CHISHOLM, supra note 26, at 275.
73. One way of illustrating these distinctions would be to say the Ship of Theseus before and
after replacement of any one plank may be "identical" in a loose sense, but not in a strict sense.
But the Ship of Theseus the Athenians end up with, while therefore not strictly identical, may be
strictly persistent (depending on how we define the stuff of strict persistence; see Part IV, infra),
whereas the Cretans' reassembled ship may be persistent only in some loose sense of the term.
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mentary thing, such as R-phase, the momentary but not identical
phase of a continuant thing, should not be seen as much of a slide.
In sum, this article suggests that one can bathe in a persisting river
twice, at different points along the river's spacetime line, which may
be the same or different spatial coordinates. Two river-phases are
"river-kindred"; but pointing to river-stage a and later to river-stage b,
while stating, "This is the Cayster," is our way of affirming inductively
the persistence, rather than the strict identity of the objects pointed to.
Ostension locates the spatial parts of a spatial continuant, as well as
the temporal phases of a thing in history, even if it is merely the his-
tory of its own continuance.
Recall the earlier scenario involving the injector pump. Witnesses
in the case of A's estate versus D are limited. They will point to the
injector pump D sold and to the one A repaired, and state that they
are the same. They will use the term 'same' in a Quinean contextual
way.7 4 This article interprets their testimony, not as meaning that the
pump-phases at sale and exposure are identical, but rather as meaning
those phases unified two particulars, the pump at tx and at ty.
Mark Heller's argument for a time-slice approach is methodical.75
His goal is "to develop a clear account of the nature of temporal
parts."'76 'Heller's most salient point shows how four-dimensional
thinking solves a sticky philosophical problem. His thesis assumes
that people want to say that each of the following propositions are
true:
(a) My body is a physical object;
(b) There is a physical object in the space that is occupied by all of
me except for my left hand;
(c) Physical objects can lose parts;
(d) There cannot be distinct physical objects occupying exactly the
same space at the same time; and
(e) Identity is transitive (if a = b, and b = c, then a = c). 77
But affirming (a) through (e) leads to a contradiction if one assumes
a three-dimensional view such as Chisholm's. Given (a), there is such
a thing as my body, which is called B. Given (b), there is a physical
object that is all of me except for my left hand, called B-minus. If my
74. Quine, supra note 61 at 622.
75. MARK HELLER, Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects, in THE ONTOLOGY OF
PHYSICAL OBJECTS: FOUR DIMENSIONAL HUNKS OF MAITER (1990), reprinted in METAPHYSICS:
AN ANTHOLOGY 312 (Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa eds., 1999).
76. Id. at 312.
77. Id. at 313.
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left hand is amputated at some time ta, this does not affect B-minus; in
other words, B-minus before t, = B-minus after ta.
Given (c), losing a part does not end my body's existence. This
must mean that B before ta = B after ta. Under (d), however, B-minus
after ta = B after t. In other words, if there cannot be distinct physical
objects occupying exactly the same space at the same time, then those
objects, such as B and B-minus at some time after t, must be identical.
But under (e)'s transitivity rule, B-minus before ta = B before t,.
We know, however, that B was bigger than B-minus before ta; so B-
minus before t # B before ta. This causes a contradiction. 78
Heller explains that three-dimensionalists avoid the contradiction
by denying one of the propositions (a) through (e). Chisholm, for ex-
ample, denies (c). But that is an "unpleasant" way out. 79 Four-dimen-
sionalism, under which (d) does not entail that B-minus after ta = B
after ta, is better according to Heller. Under this view, one may con-
sider a temporal cross section of B after ta. In other words, consider B
at some time after ta, or at ta + At. So think in terms of B at t% + At
lacking P, where P is the property.80
In this case, we easily see that B at ta + At is not B itself, wholly
present and occupying the same space at the same time as B-minus.
For the larger spacetime region, R, that begins at ta, B and B-minus
overlap, but neither one exactly fills R.81
For those who continue to object that two distinct objects seem to
be in the same space at the same time, the author suggests that they
seem to be. Heller's alternative response is that "[t]hese temporal
parts are not two distinct objects, but rather, one object under two
descriptions. '82 At any ta + At, B and B-minus share a common tem-
poral part, just as a home and garage may share a common spatial part
if attached to one another.
IV. THE CAUSAL GLUE
A. A Propagation Approach
There is now a philosophical basis for concluding that D's asbestos-
containing injector pump, like the Cayster or like you or me, persists.
A thing at any particular time is not the whole thing (0), it is just one
of Q's temporal parts or a slice in time. The thing persists temporally
78. Id.
79. Id. at 320.
80. In the equation just given, the property of having a left hand.
81. HELLER, supra note 75, at 321.
82. Id.
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in a way that analogizes to its unity across space. When we ask what
persistence consists in, we are in a position to summon language com-
mon to law and metaphysics.
To say what Q's persistence consists in is to explain how it is that 0
yesterday and Q today are the same, Q being any whole object. This
article is trying to explain how 0 yesterday and 0 today are temporal
parts, not identical, but of the same thing. Heller says that a three-
dimensionalist similarly has to explain how x one day may be x the
next, and that a four-dimensionalist's explanation need not be too
different. 83
It seems reasonable, at least as a starting point, to say that a thing's
persistence may consist in one of at least three factors: (1) some
unanalyzable property; (2) convention; or (3) some sort of causal flow.
As Charles Dunbar Broad says in another context, Factor 1 can hardly
be counted as a way of explaining persistence because it states persis-
tence cannot be explained "but must simply be swallowed whole with
that philosophic jam which Professor Alexander calls 'natural
piety." 8 4 Calling persistence primitive entails an assumption that is
both unnecessary and unfounded. Viewed another way, a conclusion
that persistence is unanalyzable may presuppose the sort of rigor in-
volved in showing that a proposition is undecidable, which is a task
even Kurt G6del did not undertake for any particular propositions. 85
In any event, even if persistence was primitive, our treating it other-
wise would be permissible, "though at the expense of multiplying
moves."'86 Therefore, factor 1 must be rejected.
Factor 2 provides an explanation dealing with our intersubjective
arrangements, not prior facts of the matter. In other words, factor 2
says that there is something about 0 that entails its persistence, but
only by virtue of the conventions that people have adopted. This is a
compelling position. Whether one takes the Eiffel Tower and Wilfred
Owen's 87 rifle-butt to be a single object is set in a matrix of human
interests and judgments that define our "presumably common fund of
83. Id. at 322.
84. Charles Dunbar Broad, Mechanism and Emergentism, in THE MIND AND ITS PLACE IN
NATURE (1925), reprinted in METAPHYSICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 487, 492 (Jaegwon Kim & Ernest
Sosa eds., 1999).
85. See KURT GODEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECID1ABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA
MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS (Bernard Meltzer trans., 1992) (1931).
86. WILFRID SELLARS, Some Reflections on Language Games, in SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND
REALITY 321, 330 (1963).
87. English poet noted for his anger at the cruelty and waste of war. See www.britannica.com/
eb/article?eu=59242&tocid=O&query=Wilfred%20owen (last visited Aug. 1, 2001). He is noted
for his experiments in assonance.
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conceptualization. ' 88 But when our reference frame settles due to
that common fund, we are left with some 0 within the set of all things.
Hillary Putnam stated that what is conventional and what is factual
is relative to the alternatives that are sensible in the context. Saying
there is an injector pump on the USS Casablanca, instead of saying
there is a field of colliding particles, may be a matter of convention,
while saying the pump or field persists should be a matter of fact
within our fixed reference frame. 89 Therefore, we are willing to over-
look those in the familiar three-dimensional world who are prepared
to waive the idea that the toaster ends where the rugrat begins. It
does, but not simply by mutual understanding, rather in stable theory.
It is tempting to conclude that persistence is a matter of social con-
struction, and that people can construct that notion differently. Per-
haps they can. For example, Heller sees one's computer as persisting,
while Chisholm applying Hume, says people "feign identity when
what [they] are dealing with is in fact only a 'succession of related
objects'." 90 While people can have differing conceptual schemes, as
Quine states,9' it does not follow, as Chisholm would say,92 that things
will not in fact be one way or the other.
Conceding that the idea of persistence is precisely the area in which
evolutionary epistemology may be at its weakest,93 there may be much
to be said for the position that biological mechanisms select our gen-
eral beliefs. 94 Perhaps one can merely hypothesize which beliefs
evolution has scythed, but even tiny infants "expect objects to con-
tinue to exist after the objects go out of sight,' 95 and that is not an
88. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics, in FROM A LOGI-
CAL POINT OF VIEW: NINE LoGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 47, 62 (2d ed, 1953); NOAM CHOM-
SKY, NEW HORIZONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND 21 (2000).
89. Hilary Putnam, Convention: A Theme in Philosophy, 13 NEW LITERARY HISTORY (1981),
reprinted in HILARY PUTNAM, 3 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: REALISM AND REASON 178-79 (1983).
90. CHISHOLM, supra note 26, at 280; DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 254-55
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1888) (1739-40) (saying "[t]hus we feign the continu'd existence of
the perceptions of our senses ... [and] attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or
interrupted objects").
91. Quine, supra note 61, at 632.
92. CHISHOLM, supra note 26, at 335.
93. Michael Levin, Why We Believe in Other Minds, 44 PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RE-
SEARCH 343, 349 (1984).
94. Cf Harold N. Lee, Discourse and Event: The Logician and Reality, in 18 THE LIBRARY OF
LIVING PHILOSOPHERS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF W.V. QUINE 295, 310 (Lewis Edwin Hahn & Paul
Arthur Schilpp eds., 2d ed. 1987) (saying minds "are functions of the organism. The organism is
what has developed and survived in the course of evolution, but evolution is a continuous pro-
cess, and in this process intelligence has emerged as a major survival mechanism of humans.").
95. Paul Bloom, Language and Mental Life, in TOWARD A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 11:
THE SECOND TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES 561, 568 (Stuart R. Hameroff et al. eds., 1998)
(citing R. Baillargeon, Object permanence in 3.5- and 4.5-month-old infants, in 23 CHILD DEVEL-
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expectation that experience frustrates with age. So it seems that
evolution has selected our belief that things persist. While this does
not guarantee the belief is right or that it is not some sort of evolution-
based, nondiscretionary convention, it is at least strong evidence that
members of the species that do not share the belief find themselves at
serious odds with reality.
This suggests that although we cannot rule out the idea that persis-
tence is simply a matter of convention, there are probably good rea-
sons for concluding that the continuation of things has something to
do with the way they really are. In other words, if one understands
persistence, one is likely to know something about the thing said to
persist, not just about social psychology or stipulation.
But if persistence is an analyzable feature of physical things as they
really are, we are back to our original question: what does this persis-
tence consist in? For Bertrand Russell,96 persistence was a causal line:
"A causal line may always be regarded as the persistence of some-
thing-a person, a table, a photon, or what not. Throughout a given
causal line, there may be constancy of quality, constancy of structure,
or a gradual change of either, but not sudden changes of any consider-
able magnitude. '97
One can say two things about the idea that persistence consists of
some sort of causality. First, if that were the case, then causality
would nicely explain the welding of a thing's temporal parts. And sec-
ond, perspicacious thinkers think it may be the case. 98
However, an appeal to authority, such as Locke's argumentum ad
verecundiam, is not good enough; an argument is needed. If it is logi-
cally necessary that a thing's temporal parts be causally connected,
then persistence depends on causation. And if persistence depends on
causation, then persistence is explained in a very compelling way. 99
OIMENI 655 (1987)); see also NOAM CHOMSKY, NEW HORIZONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE
AND MINI) 92-93 (2000) (reporting that "infant studies of pats years provide considerable reason
to believe that such 'reification' [of bodies] appears in the first few months of life"); WILLARD
VAN ORMAN QUINE, THE Roors OF REFERENCE (THE PAUL CARUS LECTURES) 54 (1974) (say-
ing "the unifying principle.., of bodies generally.., is apparently a sort of similarity that we are
innately predisposed to appreciate.... It is no wonder that bodies, bodily identity and bodily
persistence, are the mainstay of ontology.... Man and other animals are body-minded by natu-
ral selection"); Elizabeth Spelke, Origins of Visual Knowledge, in 2 INVITATION TO COGNITIVE
SCIENCE: VISUAL COGNITION AND ACTION 99, 99-127 (Daniel N. Osherson et al. eds., 1990).
96. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
97. BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 459 (1948).
98. See e.g., Armstrong, supra note 58, at 74-78; HELLER, supra note 75, at 323; RUSSELL,
supra note 96.
99. See Jaegwon Kim, Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence, 5 PHIL. ISSUES
51, 68 (1994) (proposing that "explanations track dependence relations").
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David Armstrong provides a decent example. Assume there are
two very puissant deities, each with the split-second clout to destroy
and create, who operate independently of each other. The first deity
annihilates Jack Kerouac at a place p, and at time t. The second deity,
unaware of what the first is up to, and who has never heard of any
beat poet, decides to create a man at p and t. By coincidence on a
cosmic scale, the second deity's man has exactly the same physical and
mental characteristics that Kerouac had at p and t.10 0
The question is whether Kerouac has persisted. Although all
humans on the scene, including Kerouac 2, will say 'yes', our intuition
will be strongly in the other direction because we know what hap-
pened. The reason is a break in the causal nexus between Kerouac,
and Kerouac 2. In other words, Kerouac 2 derives from the creative de-
ity, not from Kerouac. Armstrong opines, incidentally, that if there
were some "suitable" causal connection between Kerouac and Ker-
ouac 2, even a spatiotemporal gap between the two would not defeat
Kerouac's continuance.'0 1
Armstrong argues nicely in favor of the causal theory. At the same
time, though, it is probably possible to concoct a counterexample,
showing that even a causal link between Kerouac, and Kerouac 2 is not
sufficient to confer persistence. For instance, assume the second deity
encounters Kerouac at p and t, and decides instantaneously to create
a duplicate. The first deity still annihilates Kerouacl, and we are again
left with only Kerouac2, but this time there is a causal connection be-
tween the two Kerouacs. It seems that intuitively, one would not
favor the notion that Kerouac has persisted.
Although Armstrong might respond that such a causal connection
would not be "suitable," what we may infer from the counterexample
is that causality, however necessary, is not a sufficient condition for
persistence. Indeed, Armstrong's suitability requirement implies the
same idea. One would therefore resolve the sufficiency issue by figur-
ing out what sort of causal connection between temporal parts is suita-
ble. It should be noted however, that Armstrong concedes that he has
not done So. 10 2
Hume's classic pronouncement was that "we may define a cause to
be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to
the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other
words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had
100. See Armstrong, supra note 58, at 76. The context in which Armstrong offers his similar
example is the debate between the identity and relational views of persistence.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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existed." 103 Hume's first sentence says causation is a matter of con-
stant conjunction; however, his "other words" offer a counterfactual
notion of causation. 04
It is difficult to conceptualize oneself today and tomorrow, or the
radiator yesterday and today, in terms of constant conjunction. It is
unclear whether things like people at t, are always followed by things
like people at t2 . What does seem clear is that persistence applies not
only to aggregate entities, such as the United States Supreme Court,
but to individuals, such as Cardozo. Hume's first sentence suggests
that causes and effects can be named by singular terms;10 5 on the
other hand, the idea of causal regularities means looking beyond sin-
gle instances to "events of similar sorts, similarly conjoined."' 10 6
The counterfactual analysis offers little help. In the counterexam-
ple to Armstrong's position, but for Kerouacl, Kerouac 2 "never had
existed. ' 10 7 Hume did not have to work these issues through because
for him, we only "feign" identity.'0 8
Russell, on the other hand, did have persistence in mind. His per-
sistence was a causal line.'0 9 A flow or propagation theory of causa-
tion, seeing causality as a property of individual processes, seems most
compatible with the notion of a causal line and may give us the key to
persistence. Professor Wesley Salmon's analysis takes us most of the
way there. 110
Recalling Russell, Salmon proffers "two fundamental" and "inti-
mately related" causal concepts: production and propagation."' For
Salmon, each concept is very familiar to common sense. For example,
production comes to mind when we say a hammer's blow drives a nail,
meaning that "the impact produces penetration of the nail into the
wood ... When we say that a person's embarrassment was due to a
thoughtless remark, we mean that an inappropriate comment pro-
103. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 72 (1988) (1748).
104. See David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556, 556-67 (1973).
105. Donald Davidson, Causal Relations, 64 J. PHIL. 691, 691 (1967).
106. Michael Tooley, The Nature of Causation: A Singularist Account, 16 CANADIAN J. PHIL.
271, 286 (1990).
107. HUME, supra note 105, at 72.
108. Id. at 254.
109. RUSSELL, supra note 97, at 459.
110. Salmon, supra note 39, at 285. Other philosophers choose a process approach to causa-
tion. See Jerrold J. Aronson, On the Grammar of 'Cause'," 22 SYNTHESE 414 (1971); Phil Dowe,
Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory, 59 PHIL. SCI-
ENCE 195 (1992); Curt John Ducasse, On the Nature and Observability of the Causal Relation, 23
J. PHIL. 57 (1926); David Fair, Causation and the Flow of Energy, 14 ERKENNTNIS 219 (1979).
111. Salmon, supra note 39, at 285.
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duced psychological discomfort."1 12 Examples of propagation are
equally familiar. "By means of memory, the influence of .. .past
events is transmitted to the present... Signals transmitted from a
broadcasting station are received by the radio in our home."113
Under Salmon's analysis, causal influence is propagated by causal
processes, and causal interactions produce changes in those
processes. 114  These two new terms require definition: causal
processes and causal interactions. At the risk of circularity, causal
processes, paradigmatically an electromagnetic wave or a moving par-
ticle, are the means by which structure is propagated or transmitted
from one spacetime region of the universe to another. 115 Causal inter-
actions are typified by various sorts of collisions that modify struc-
tures.116 So propagation usually takes a while, whereas production is
often simultaneous. 117
Before returning to persistence and its legal implications, two more
ideas must be explained. The first is the difference between causal
processes, which are capable of transmitting information or signals,
and pseudo-processes, which are not.1 18 An intervention into a causal
process permanently transforms that process. For example, if a red
filter is hung along the path of a light beam, the beam will appear red
the rest of the way. Illustration of pseudo-processes include shadows
and spots of light cast on a wall from some distant light source. If an
airplane's moving shadow is modified when crossing a thatched roof
to form a new shape, that modification will not persist.
The second idea is illustrated with a fork metaphor. A conjunctive
fork has to do with the common cause of two or more effects. 119 For
example, A and B eat bad salmon at Sushisay. Their resulting ill-
nesses are not independent, so the probability of A and B getting sick
is greater than the product of the probabilities of their individual ill-
nesses: P(A • B) > P(A) x P(B). But, given their common cause, A's
and B's illnesses occur independently. So: P(A • B/C) = P(A/C) x
P(B/C). Another way of looking at this is to say that the salmon, com-
112. Id. at 285-86.
113. Id. at 286.
114. Id. at 295.
115. Id. at 296.
116. Id. at 298.
117. Id. at 300.
118. Salmon, supra note 39, at 287.
119. Id. at 289. See generally HANS REICHENBACH, PHILOSOPHIE DER RAUM-ZEIT-LEHRE
(1928); HANS REICHENBACH, THE DIRECTION OF TIME (1956).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
mon to A and B, screens off or makes statistically irrelevant one's
illness from the other's. 20
An interactive fork, on the other hand, involves a direct interaction
between two processes. If Chubbs, a pool player, sinks the 8-ball, he
sinks the cue ball, too. Chubbs has a .5 probability of sinking the 8-
ball and a .5 probability of scratching. This scenario is not a conjunc-
tive fork, though, because the balls' collision does not screen off the
outcomes. In other words, the prior .5 probability that Chubbs
scratches, is not equal to the 1.0 probability that he scratches given
that he sinks the 8-ball. So with interactive forks involving the spatio-
temporal intersection of causal processes, the modifications in each
process, A and B, respectively, persist after the intersection (C).121
For such a causal interaction: P(A • B/C) > P(A/C) x P(B/C).
B. Legal Terms
This article began with a harmful product causing injury, and ad-
dressed the issue of whether the original manufacturer is legally re-
sponsible. Cardozo says the product persists as "a thing of danger"
even when its buyer changes component parts, unless the conduct of
the new part's manufacturer is an intervening cause. 122 This persis-
tence can be explained in terms of a causal flow. A thing persists by
transmitting its own structure through time in a causal process.
How is it that a subway map or an axe-head propagates its own
structure when it seems just to rest there uneventfully? Ordinary per-
ception misses the electromagnetic forces that hold a thing's mole-
cules together. Atoms are not divisible but loaded with subatomic
particles. The Rutherford-Bohr model of the atom 123 and its orbiting
electrons did not hold up, but in the modern model, electrons move
around the atomic nucleus in K, L, M, N, 0, P and Q shells, consisting
of probability clouds. For Richard Feynman, the most informative sci-
entific sentence is the atomic hypothesis "that all things are made of
atoms-little particles that move around in perpetual motion, at-
tracting each other when they are a little distance apart, but repelling
upon being squeezed into one another."' 24 This is all causal language
for reckoning a debris of scrubbed shells at t, ... t,,.
120. Salmon, supra note 39, at 290-91. Salmon provides other probability conditions not nec-
essary here, and explains the stipulation that none of the relevant probabilities equal zero or
one. Id.
121. 1d. at 294-95.
122. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389-90, (N.Y. 1916).
123. See ALBRECHTI FOLsING. ALBERT EINSTEIN 476-477 (Ewald Osers trans. 1997) (1993);
GEORG Joos, THEORETICAL PHYSICS 647 (3d ed. 1958).
124. RICHAR1 P. FEYNMAN ET AL., 1 THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS 1-2 (1963).
[Vol. 51:39
2001] A "TIME-SLICE" APPROACH TO TORT LAW 63
Products liability law aligns with a variant of the causal line ap-
proach to persistence. Jaegwon Kim explains that causal processes
consist in constituent events and properties.125 In law, intention or
purposefulness is often requisite to liability. Legal causation is tradi-
tionally associated with the mental element of foreseeability. 126 Inten-
tion is a suitable signifier of foreseeability. 127  Intentions and
purposeful designs are constituent properties of a persisting thing, a
causal flow, in product liability cases. 128
However, one should be prepared to concede at this -point, that
while persistence arguably has to do with a fact independent of inter-
125. Jaegwon Kim, Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event, 70 J. PHIL. 217,
231-33 (1973).
126. Legal thinking has always been unsettled about whether "foreseeability" ought to be
linked to the duty or proximate cause elements in a cause of action. See John C. O'Quinn, Note,
Not-So-Strict Liability: A Foreseeability Test for Rylands v. Fletcher and Other Lessons from
Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather PLC, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 287, 293 n.60
(2000) (saying "'[f]oreseeability' is often intertwined with the 'proximate cause' and 'duty of
care' requirements"); see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). For
some views linking foreseeability to legal causation, see generally Mirand v. City of New York,
50, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372 (App. Div. 1994) (saying the test of a causal nexus "is whether under all the
circumstances the chain of events that followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or
foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the . . . negligence"); People v. Matos, 83
N.Y.2d 509, 511-12 (1994) (noting that some courts have found causation when "the event was a
directly foreseeable consequence" of defendant's malfeasance); Note, Recent Cases: Statutory
Interpretation - Second Circuit Holds That Health Care Funds Lack Standing to Sue Tobacco
Companies Under RICO-Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191
F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999), 113 HARV. L. REV. 1063, 1065 n.21 (2000) (noting court's view that
"both directness and foreseeability are elements of proximate cause" (citing Laborers Local 17
Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1999)); Note, Hand-
guns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1927-28 (1984) (saying "[t]he predominant
standard for proximate cause is reasonable foreseeability of injury"); Robert L. Rabin, Law For
Law's Sake: The Idea of Private Law, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2266 (1996 book review) (reporting
that, for the author Ernest Weinrib, "proximate cause is properly defined in terms of foreseeabil-
ity"); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 625 n.44 (1984) (saying
"the issue of proximate causation can be viewed as turning on the foreseeability of the result").
127. In tort law foreseeability is more often linked to a negligent or reckless mental state. A
larger, albeit collateral, philosophical point is that law's natural bias is in favor of the mental
being causally influential in the physical world. See generally Donald Davidson, Mental Events,
in EXPERIENCE AND THEORY (Lawrence Foster & JW. Swanson eds., 1970), reprinted in DON-
ALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACrIONS AND EVENTS 207, 208 (1980) (asserting "that at least some
mental events interact causally with physical events"); Robert Van Gulick, Who's in Charge
Here? And Who's Doing All the Work?, in MENTAL CAUSATION 232, 232, 255-56 (John Heil &
Alfred Mele eds., 1993) (saying "Greta chose her tomatoes carefully, picking only those that
looked the reddest," and "there is no reason to ... claim that mental or higher-order properties
fail to be causally potent in any sense that physical properties are potent").
128. Professor Grover wonders about a manufacturer who sells a machine-making machine,
where the harm results from the normal use of one of the machine-made machines. Here,
though, the issue would be the persistence of the meta-, or original, machine, and the manufac-
turer's intention that it produce the sort of machine-made machine that caused the harm, or at
least that it be used as it was (hence 'normal').
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subjective agreement, legal constituent elements are conventions laid
down in the legal culture. Law, after all, is a social construction. If a
social arrangement is a constituent element in persistence, one may
have to accommodate a relativized identity or persistence at least to
some extent. It is not unreasonable to hold that one's world view
meshes "meager input" with "torrential output," and sensory content
with conceptual scheme. 129 When talking within a legal framework,
one is usually dealing with an admixture of the way things are and the
way we fix them.
A more pressing concern is whether law must have any patience for
persistence at all, given that its decision-making is based on intention
and foreseebility. Imagine a hypothetical antagonist, William, who
provides the following scenario: An exploding soda bottle topples a
lamp that strikes Mrs. P. No one claims the bottle is one of the lamp's
spatial or temporal parts. Nevertheless, the bottle manufacturer may
be liable if that sort of sequence of events was deemed reasonably
foreseeable, assuming that other elements were accounted for. 30
Thus, in the earlier pump scenario, if D's pump ceases to exist due to
replacement asbestos gaskets and a different thing begins, foreseeabil-
ity alone should make the case for A's estate and the notion of persis-
tence is shaved away.
A response to William's argument examines the notion of "reasona-
ble foreseeability" upon which he relies. Legal scholars say that this
concept melds objective and subjective factors.131 A shift in philoso-
phy's accepted view, entailing that D's pump did not persist through
the time of A's exposure, would filter through the collective con-
sciousness and skew the foreseeability factor. A court's or fact
finder's judgment regarding what a party should reasonably have an-
ticipated in the context of the component parts issue must depend, at
least to some extent, on a supposition about whether A encountered
D's product. D rightly believes it will benefit if it can convince the
court that the injurious product could not have been the same product
it sold, as a philosophical, as well as legal matter.132 D's lawyers will
likely cite Chisholm's argument, if they have encountered it, going be-
yond the theories of Wood and Exxon. 133 Although 'foreseeable' is a
129. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY
AND OTHER ESSAYS 69, 83 (1969).
130. For example, the bottle was not tampered with post-sale.
131. G. Kristian Miccio, Notes from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and Con-
ceptions of Accountability, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 147 n.81 (2000).
132. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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customary legal term, the component parts problem tightly weaves is-
sues of persistence and foreseeability.
C. Tweaking Salmon's Theory
Causation welds persistence and, in tort law, intention is one signi-
fier of foreseeability, which is causally meaningful. Salmon's propaga-
tion approach to causation suggests the next concern. He seems to
prescribe an ontological distinction between causal and pseudo-
processes. If one tries to locate intention within that ontology, it ap-
pears to fall on either side of the divide. The problem is that in the
context of the persistence, as opposed to the manufacture of defective
products, intention seems to be the constituent of pseudo-processes,
not causal processes.
Consider the status of human beings as agents. Donald Davidson
labels "anything an agent does intentionally an action, including inten-
tional omissions.' 1 34 It is easy to see that a person's intentions have
causal efficacy in that context. If that intention changes before one
has acted, that modification will persist and one will perform a differ-
ent action.
The way people's intention may persist in a product of our actions is
different. That sort of process is more akin to a pseudo-process,
where intention lies in the product like a light spot that is projected
onto the wall or a shadow cast on the pavement. The spot that is
shaded will be colder and could allow for a dangerous ice patch. One
could heat the spot and melt the ice, but the shadow itself continues in
its regular way, perhaps manifesting but not transmitting, causal en-
ergy. 135 The previous discussion of the Welch and Morris cases 136 sug-
gested that a defendant's intention or purposefulness seemed to be
134. Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 60 J. PHIL. 685, 686 n.2 (1963). Nor is it
likely the causal question is begged once we acknowledge intention's mind-dependence. Analo-
gously, the received view has been that color is a subjective property, just an appearance we
bring to things. See BARRY STROUD, THE QUEST FOR REALITY: SUBJECTIVISM AND THE META-
PHYSICS OF COLOR (2000). But for Salmon-who, let's assume, would subscribe to that
view-color can be a constituent in a causal process. Salmon, supra note 35, at 288; cf STROUO,
supra, at 176-77 (offering, at least arguendo, that, although many view color as "causally inert,
... it is not true that colour plays no role in what goes [on] in the world if part of 'what goes on'
is that people see lemons to be yellow, tomatoes to be red, and so on. Jones sees a lemon on the
table and sees it to be yellow, in part because there is a yellow lemon there. If an object of that
colour had not been there, she would not have seen the colour she saw"). The question of
whether intention is a constituent in a pseudo-process-and we're saying it is in connection with a
product's persistence-is an independent one, and it is only in that case that Salmon's approach
would deprive it of causal efficacy.
135. Wesley C. Salmon, Causality Without Counterfactuals, 61 PHIL. ScL. 297, 306 (1994), re-
printed in WESLEY C. SALMON, CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION 248 (1998).
136. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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projected onto the injurious product in its later phases. Salmon might
assert that, as one can warm a shaded cold spot, a manufacturer could
repair the product and make it safe; however, the manufacturer's de-
sign or intent remains unchanged, already projected onto that prod-
uct's "world-line." 137
Because we can conceive of intention's role in both causal and
pseudo-processes, it seems fair to say that what makes a process
pseudo is not the pseudo-status of its constituent events or properties
qua events or properties, but rather the way in which these events or
properties are connected with one another. 38 However, when inten-
tion is connected with a product in such a way that Salmon would call
it "pseudo," to be consistent with his approach, it cannot be causally
meaningful. We need intention to be causally efficacious as a constitu-
ent element in a product's persistence because this is the best explana-
tion of how a defendant's conduct may be linked to injury caused by
dangerous replacement components.
In other words, if intention or purposeful design is a mere pseudo-
constituent in the context of persistence, then it does not carry the
causal power needed to transmit a defendant's blameworthiness to the
injurious event. This would fortify a manufacturer's defense that re-
placement of the dangerous parts severed the causal link between its
misconduct and the harm. Courts' adopting this legal rule decree, on
society's behalf, a modified convention.
However, the replacement of a dangerous component part with a
similarly dangerous part is itself evidence that the maker's intent is
causally influencing actions down the road. This fact pulls in the di-
rection of reforming Salmon's thesis. Indeed, a closer look shows that
there is a significant gap in Salmon's treatment of the causal status of
pseudo-processes. His profound essay suggests, but does not directly
address, the phenomenon of the intersection of a causal process with a
pseudo-process. This lapse points to an interesting enigma in his
propagation view of causality. 39
Salmon says the world "is full of processes (causal or pseudo-) and
these processes undergo frequent intersections with one another."' 140
Causal processes may intersect, of course, and Salmon allows that the
137. Salmon, supra note 135 at 308.
138. 1 thank Jaegwon Kim for suggesting this point.
139. My critique is not derived from either Nancy Cartwright's counterfactual criticism, see
Salmon, supra note 137, at 302 (talking about Cartwright's counterexample conveyed to Salmon
"in conversation"), or from Dowe's conserved quantity criticism. See Phil Dowe, Wesley
Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory, 59 PHIL. SCi. 195, 195-
216 (1992).
140. Salmon, supra note 39, at 295.
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same is true of pseudo-processes, such as when the shadows of two
airplanes coincide momentarily.14' In the latter case, neither process
is modified in any lasting way. Salmon also indicates that only causal
processes can be involved in a causal interaction: "If two processes
intersect in a manner that does qualify as a causal interaction, then we
may conclude that both processes are causal, for each has been
marked or (i.e. modified) in the intersection with the other, and each
process transmits the mark beyond the point of intersection."'' 42 At
the same time, causal processes can intersect without modification in
either case, just as when light rays pass through one another. 143
Although Salmon may be focusing on the circumstances of an inter-
section between a causal process and a pseudo-process, called a hybrid
intersection, his language is ambiguous. In a passage that nearly rec-
ognizes the hybrid, Salmon says, "If either or both of the intersecting
processes are pseudo-processes, no such mutual modification oc-
curs."'144 The issue left open by this statement is whether, in a hybrid
intersection, a modification may occur in only one of the processes.
Salmon meant to say no. For him, when two processes intersect and
energy and momentum "are transferred from one to the other, their
respective states of motion are altered."' 45 This can happen "only
when two causal processes intersect."' 146 However, Salmon does not
expressly state that if either or both of the intersecting processes is a
pseudo-process, there cannot be a modification in either. So it may be
useful to examine the hybrid from both sides.
When a hybrid intersection occurs, the pseudo-process will often be
modified, but not in a way, that persists beyond the period of intersec-
tion. If a beam of light is cast on a shadow, the shadow, paradigmati-
cally a pseudo-process, would be modified by fading or disappearing,
but only so long as the beam continued to be cast.
More interestingly, hybrid intersections often do seem to produce
lasting modifications in the causal process, and therefore, take on the
appearance of causal interactions, at least in ordinary language inter-
pretations. For example, a racehorse galloping down the home stretch
intersects with a shadow across the track and jumps it or swerves wide
of it. Arguably, the shadow caused the horse to lose the race. A spot-
light with a red lens attached and mounted at the center of an other-
141. Id. at 294.
142. Id. at 295.
143. Id. at 294.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Salmon, supra note 39, at 294.
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wise darkened bullfighting arena, casts a large spot of red onto the
wall of the ring, thus enraging the bull. Arguably, the spot caused the
bull to charge. On a hot day people cool down in the shade; arguably,
the shade cooled them off.
Salmon's view is friendly toward ordinary language uses of causal
concepts. At the beginning of his essay, he explains causal production
in everyday terms. For instance, "[w]hen we say that a person's em-
barrassment was due to a thoughtless remark, we mean that an inap-
propriate comment produced psychological discomfort."1 47 But
Salmon neglects to account for the causal characteristics of certain hy-
brid intersections that seem equally "familiar to common sense."'1 48
Furthermore, in these instances of apparent modifications in causal
processes involved in hybrid intersections, other approaches to causa-
tion would attribute causality to the pseudo-processes. Describing the
counterfactual view, David Lewis says, "If c and e are two actual
events such that e would not have occurred without c, then c is a cause
of e. '' 149 But for the shadow across the track, the racehorse would
have run straight; but for the shade, we would have remained hot; but
for the red spot, the bull would not have charged. Causality could also
be ascribed in these scenarios in terms of Humean regularities. 150
According to Salmon's early propagation view,151 the difference be-
tween a causal process and a pseudo-process lies in the capability of
147. Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 285.
149. Lewis, supra note 106, at 563.
15I. Hume, supra note 105 at 72.
151. Salmon later revised his approach, in light of Dowe's criticisms, by adopting a conserved
quantity transmission view in lieu of the mark transmission idea. Salmon, supra note 137, at 303.
The dialogue between Salmon and Dowe may lead to a clarification of the issue I'm addressing
in this article, but only perchance. Dowe's generalization is that pseudo-processes do not "pos-
sess the type of physical quantities that are governed by conservation laws. Shadows, intersec-
tions of rulers and so on do not possess conserved quantities." Dowe, supra note 141, at 212.
Professor Salmon accepts Dowe's definition of a causal interaction, being "an intersection of
world lines which involves exchange of a conserved quantity." Id. at 210; Salmon, supra note
137, at 304. But Salmon does not agree fully with Dowe's understanding of pseudo-processes,
and their respective views may be significant here, although neither expressly addresses the hy-
brid intersection. Salmon's argument is that a pseudo-process, such as the spot on the wall,
"manifests energy in an appropriately regular way, . . . but it is not the world-line of a causal
process because the energy is not being transmitted; it is being received from an exterior source."
Id. at 308 (emphasis added). Dowe objects that it isn't the spot that possesses conserved quanti-
ties, such as energy or momentum, but the patch of wall. Phil Dowe, Causality and Conserved
Quantities: A Reply to Salmon, 62 PHIL. Sc. 321-333, 327 (1995). They concur, though, that a
pseudo-process, such as a shadow, is an "object." Id. at 331 (saying "an object, such as a
shadow"). My examples regarding the race horse and the bull concern perception. See supra
notes 142-143, and accompanying text. Perhaps, in the sense that the object of perception is said
to cause the perception; D. M. ARMSTRONG, A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND 229 (Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul eds. 1968) (saying "[i]f A is said to perceive an x, then it is entailed that x is
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the causal process to transmit marks by transmitting its own structure.
But causal influence, for Salmon, is propagated interactively. He says,
for example: "A causal influence transmitted by sound waves can
make your dog come running." 152 Even though a shadow, unlike a
pulse of light, cannot transmit its own structure or a mark, it can
"make your dog come running" or a racehorse swerve wide.
Nevertheless, Salmon's probability formula, P(A • B/C) > P(AIC) x
P(B/C), describing the relation involved in the notion of an interactive
fork in many cases does not hold for a hybrid intersection. Where A
stands for a modification in the causal process, and B for a modifica-
tion in the pseudo-process, it is not the case that P(A.B/C) > P(A/C) x
P(B/C)1 53 because P(A.B/C) = P(B/C) = 0. We are asking whether it
may ever be possible that P(A/C) > 0.
So Salmon does not explicitly address the possibility of a hybrid
intersection as this article has defined it, upon which only one of the
processes is modified. It is also worth noting that Salmon does not
discuss the possibility of any intersection upon which only one process
is modified. Where each process is causal, it seems uncontroversial
that one and only one may be modified. For example, a friend's smile
may cause another to smile, yet continue unchanged. Or consider the
collision of one billiard ball A with another B, where B is fastened
immovably to the table and thus, where P(B/C) = 0.
Salmon's language does not necessarily foreclose the possibility
that, in a hybrid intersection, the causal process may be modified; he
only says there cannot be a mutual modification in such a case. How-
the cause of A's perceptions, whatever these are"). The racetrack shadow and the red spot cause
the perception, and this is what produces the modification described. The energy manifest either
in the pseudo-process, or in the underlying causal process (depending on whose view prevails),
enables the perception-effect. This is problematic, though, to the extent that such "enabling"
entails the transmission of energy or momentum.
A question, then, is how the perception of a shadow may be distinguished from the perception
of, let's say, a parent's frown, which produces her child's unease; the frown, like Salmon's
"thoughtless remark," is a causal process. It would be strange to find transmission in these cases
but not when the perceived object is labeled, by Salmon and Dowe, a pseudo-process. It also
seems relevant that there's a difference between saying "I perceive [pseudo-process]," and "I
perceive that [there is some causal process, possessing a conserved quantity, underlying this
pseudo-process]. In the same sense that the object of perception may be said to cause the per-
ception, causality more clearly resides in the former statement.
With respect to (3), the shade that cools, Dowe's explanation may be apposite, that "[i]n real-
ity most causal processes attenuate, as there is a loss of energy to the environment." Dowe,
supra, at 331. We may see the intersection of underlying causal processes, perhaps the pulse of
sunlight and the leafy tree, rather than the pseudo-process, as entailing a loss of heat in that area
of the environment.
152. Salmon, supra note 39, at 289.
153. Salmon is careful to point out that "[t]his relation is not, however, any part of the defini-
tion of interactive fork or causal interaction." Id. at 301 n.ll.
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ever, his argument is most reasonably understood to imply that in a
hybrid scenario, there cannot be a lasting modification in the causal
process. He does not explicitly say this, however, and other ap-
proaches to causation may suggest otherwise. It should now be easier
to see how, if one modifies Salmon's view on this point, one might
resolve the problem of the causal role that intention plays in the per-
sistence of things, at least in the products liability setting.
The outcome of all of this is that even when intention falls within
Salmon's ontology as a pseudo-constituent, the process intention com-
prises may nevertheless be genuinely capable of causally transmitting
a legal actor's tortious misconduct. Despite Salmon's analysis of
pseudo-processes, the wrongful intention going into a product's manu-
facture could have the causal efficacy that Cardozo seemed to be
reading into the idea of the persistence of things.
V. CONCLUSION
Like proximate cause and duty of care, law and philosophy inter-
twine in ways that invite analysis. Courts say 'persist' from time to
time, and its use is manifest or penumbral when component parts is-
sues arise in tort law. The time-slice view explains a harmful product's
persistence, and the metaphysical basis for linking a manufacturer's
misconduct to temporally distant injury. Law complements the idea
that causality welds persistence, and stabilizes a critique of the propa-
gation approach to causality that persistence may entail.
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